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Yuka Hiruma-Kishida’s Kenkoku University is the first ever book-length study in English of 
the Nation Building University (Kenkoku Daigaku, hereafter Kendai). It would be easy to 
dismiss the 1937 founding of this university in the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo as a 
Japanese ploy to court public opinion, but, as Hiruma-Kishida shows, such a view would be 
simplistic. True, some of its founders wanted the university to be a mere propaganda tool, 
but, as Hiruma-Kishida argues, it was inspired more by pan-Asian idealism than by cynical 
calculations. 
The university was the brainchild of Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Ishiwara Kanji, 
known for his leading role in the so-called Manchurian Incident of September 1931, staged 
to provide the Japanese army with a pretext to occupy Manchuria, where they would set up 
Manchukuo. Ishiwara was a military thinker (though to describe him as a “philosopher” [p. 
19] as Hiruma-Kishida does, is going too far), a follower of a sect of Nichiren Buddhism and 
a pan-Asianist visionary. It was Ishiwara’s pan-Asianism that inspired him to advocate the 
founding of a university, where young men from Manchuria, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, 
and other areas of Asia would study together. Such a university, he thought, would help turn 
Manchukuo into “the showcase of Pan-Asian unity and a model for the political alliance, 
the East Asian league, of Asian nations against the West” (p. 23). To reflect such pan-Asian 
aspirations, Ishiwara wanted to call it “Asia University.”
But this was not to be. Conservative scholars appointed as members of a board to plan 
the new university preferred Shinto and “the imperial way” to Ishiwara’s “ethnic harmony” 
and Asian brotherhood. The university, in their view, should train administrators of 
Manchukuo (p. 27), not pursue pan-Asian ideals. Accordingly, the new institution would be 
called the “Nation Building University.” 
This conservative distortion of Ishiwara’s vision did not stif le pan-Asian idealism 
among the university’s faculty and students, but, as Hiruma-Kishida notes, their idealism 
was not always egalitarian. Many Japanese professors and students, though subscribing to 
pan-Asianism, took Japanese superiority for granted. Only Japan, they insisted, could unite 
Asia, and the first step to achieve this lofty goal would be to raise the “inferior” Chinese and 
Manchurians “to the level of the Japanese” (p. 67). Yet such ethnic arrogance did not deter 
some non-Japanese faculty from professing their love for Japan (p. 45), even if they were 
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not altogether comfortable with the Japanese claims of ethnic or cultural superiority. These 
declarations of love for Japan were not, it appears, made out of fear or through coercion, 
since other faculty members, Japanese and non-Japanese, could be and often were critical of 
Japanese policies.
The students’ views were just as diverse as the faculty’s. Some non-Japanese students, 
it seems, supported the war effort; others remained undecided; and others still, though 
probably a minority for most of Kendai’s existence, engaged in various forms of resistance. 
Pan-Asian ideals of Japanese students were affected by their daily contact with non-Japanese 
students. Such exchanges produced mixed results, making some Japanese students even 
more arrogant, while leading others to question the official hierarchical version of pan-
Asianism. This diversity of views was possible partly because the economist Sakuta Shōichi 
(appointed vice president in 1939), and most other professors, though conservative, generally 
tolerated freedom of expression. There was markedly less tolerance after Sakuta was forced 
to resign in the wake of the arrest of several Chinese students for anti-Japanese activities in 
1942. His replacement, Lieutenant General Suetaka Kamezō, tried to run the university like 
an army barracks, but even such a heavy-handed approach failed to suppress free expression 
completely.
In fact, it was during Suetaka’s term in office that resistance by non-Japanese students 
intensified. At one point in late 1943, Hiruma-Kishida states, some twenty-four Kendai 
students were imprisoned for alleged “political crimes” (p. 135). In many cases, however, 
students objected not to Japanese rule as such, but to arbitrary acts by the Japanese 
authorities, notably the 1942 appointment of Suetaka and the 1943 replacement of regular 
university instruction with military training.
The existence of Kendai was brought to an abrupt end by the Soviet attack on Japan 
on 9 August 1945. Japan’s surrender and the subsequent return of Manchuria to China 
did not, however, extinguish the Kendai legacy. Japanese graduates did not have to hide 
their Kendai background, and back in Japan some of them pursued successful careers in 
diplomacy, business, and the media. By contrast, Chinese and Korean alumni thought it 
prudent not to advertise their Kendai past, at least initially. In the more relaxed climate of 
the 1990s, however, there was no need for such discretion: reminiscences were published 
and contact between them and Japanese alumni were reestablished. This strongly suggests 
that the Japanese efforts to promote Asian solidarity in Manchukuo via education were not 
entirely fruitless. As Hiruma-Kishida notes, the Kendai legacy also lives on institutionally. 
Changchun University can be regarded as Kendai’s heir. It was founded in the 1990s 
through the joint efforts of Chinese and Japanese Kendai alumni, and it is located on what 
used to be the Kendai campus.
Drawing on a wide range of contemporary sources, reminiscences, and interviews, 
Hiruma-Kishida shows that the ideological complexity of Manchukuo defies any simplistic 
generalizations. She also sheds light on the contradictions between nationalism and pan-
Asianism which even the most idealistic pan-Asianists found difficult to overcome. 
Unfortunately the book has some weaknesses. One of these is Hiruma-Kishida’s 
tendency to take various statements at face value, as in her discussion of Ishiwara’s views. 
Ishiwara’s thought, shaped largely by his Nichiren Buddhism and Confucianism, was 
apocalyptic. Peace, he prophesied, would only prevail on earth after a series of devastating 
conflicts, which Japan, in pursuit of its “global mission as a world savior,” would win in a 
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final conflagration against the United States (pp. 19–20). Such madcap notions make it easy 
to see why his pan-Asianism was “rooted in a sober conviction that militarism was essential 
to the future of Japan” (p. 19), but they are difficult to reconcile with Ishiwara’s allegedly 
egalitarian pan-Asianism, especially as he maintained that there existed “a hierarchy of 
civilizations” (p. 21). All this makes one wonder whether, as Hiruma-Kishida suggests, 
Ishiwara’s vision of Kendai, if realized, would have been better than the conservative vision 
that actually prevailed. 
The book moreover should have been edited more carefully. The publishing house’s 
correct name is Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, not Yoshikawa Hirobumi kan (p. 198, p. 247); 
Sakuta’s given name is Shōichi, not Sōichi; and Naitō Konan should not have a macron 
over the second “o” (p. 9, p. 200). These reservations apart, Hiruma-Kishida’s book is a 
valuable contribution that should not be ignored by any serious student of the history of 
Manchukuo, Japanese colonial policy, pan-Asianism, or the history of Japanese education.
